projects fluxboard

FluxBoard's mark: a staggered three-row keyboard with one Watermelon key lifted out of its slot

fluxboard

Beta

The keyboard that keeps what you type on your phone.

Glide typing, autocorrect that learns you, themes you can actually edit, and a sticker studio built right in. Zero telemetry. Zero accounts. Zero cost.

v0.1.7.5-BETA · Android 8.0+ · Kotlin · MIT

01 · what it is

Your keyboard sees everything

Every message, every search, every half-typed thought you deleted before sending. Most keyboards ship that somewhere.

FluxBoard doesn’t. It has no analytics, no crash reporter, no ad SDK and no Google Play Services. The dictionary it builds from your typing lives in the app’s private storage and is never sent to a server; it only moves if you transfer your library to another phone of yours. And it’s still a keyboard you’ll want to use: fast, good-looking, and yours to reshape.

  • Android
  • Kotlin
  • keyboard
  • on-device
  • open source

02 · why people switch

Five reasons to switch

It learns you, and only you

Predictions and autocorrect run entirely on the device. Corrections are weighted by where the keys actually sit, so “vall” becomes “call” (the key your thumb clipped) rather than whatever word is most common.

Glide typing that copes with real thumbs

Swipe through the letters. Doubled letters, rounded corners and fast swipes are all handled, and when two words share a path (to/too) the other reading is one tap away in the suggestion strip.

It’s yours to design

Edit every colour, the key shapes, fonts, a background image, and how much haze sits behind the keys. Remap the layout. Add a number row. Set the height, key size and bottom gap on three separate sliders.

It protects passwords without being asked

FluxBoard reads the field type itself instead of trusting the app to flag it. In a password or PIN field it stops learning, suggesting, autocorrecting, glide-decoding and clipboard capture, and a numeric PIN field gets a clean digits-only pad. For everything else there’s a privacy switch on the keyboard that stays on until you turn it off.

Stickers, made from your own stuff

Cut a sticker out of a screenshot or photo, edit it again later, sort it into categories, and send it straight from the keyboard. Trim a video clip and it becomes a GIF or animated WebP.

03 · everything else in the box

The small things

  • Clipboard history that only you can clear
  • Double-tap shift for caps lock, double-space for a full stop
  • Space-bar cursor scrubbing and a text-editing panel with a proper cursor pad
  • Hold backspace and swipe left to delete whole words
  • Long-press any key for its symbols, with currency on 4 and superscripts on the digits
  • Emoji picker with search, recents and an emoticons tab
  • Media controls for whatever's playing
  • Haptics with a strength slider that feels the same on every phone
  • Local typing stats (keys and words typed), kept on the device
  • Phone-to-phone migration over Wi-Fi, paired with a QR code

04 · privacy you can verify

Enforced by the build

Plenty of apps promise privacy. FluxBoard’s two biggest claims are enforced by the build, so a regression can’t ship quietly.

Every release APK is scanned

It gets unpacked, and both its DEX files and R8’s mapping are scanned. Any Play Services, ML Kit, Firebase or datatransport class fails the build. The check includes a positive control, so if the scan itself breaks it fails loudly instead of passing.

The tester usage log is absent, not switched off

The usage log that tester builds keep is proven to be absent from release builds as a class, not just switched off by a flag.

Your personal dictionary and clipboard history are also kept out of Android’s cloud backup on purpose. The full picture, including every permission and why it exists, is in PRIVACY.md.

The write-upHow the keyboard on your phone collects data8 sections · 6 sources

What a keyboard sees

On Android a keyboard is an input method: a separate app that every other app hands its text fields to. Messages, searches, addresses, card numbers and passwords all pass through it before the app they were meant for receives them. That is why Android shows a warning when you switch on a keyboard you installed yourself, saying it may be able to collect everything you type.

The keyboard that came with your phone gets no such warning. It was chosen for you, it is often a system app you cannot uninstall, and its settings are the defaults almost nobody changes. That is what makes collection by it passive: nothing has to be agreed to, enabled, or noticed.

Who marks a field private

A keyboard is told what kind of field it is typing into by the app. A password field declares a password input type. Separately, an app can set a flag asking the keyboard not to learn from what is typed there, which browsers use for private tabs.

Both are requests, not enforcement. A keyboard that wants the words can ignore them, and one that honours only the no-learning flag still learns from password fields, because Android’s own text fields do not set that flag for passwords.[6] Whether your passwords end up in a prediction dictionary is decided by keyboard code you cannot read.

Telemetry, by default

The most careful public study of mainstream Android keyboards we know of is a 2022 Trinity College Dublin dissertation that captured and decoded the network traffic of Google’s Gboard, Microsoft’s SwiftKey and the open-source AnySoftKeyboard.[1] Gboard is the keyboard preinstalled on Pixel phones and many others.

Both proprietary keyboards sent large amounts of telemetry: timestamped entries with hardware details, the length of each word typed, the languages used, and the name of the app the keyboard was open in. Gboard’s logs carried the phone’s Android ID and SwiftKey’s carried the Google Advertising ID, so the records tie to one handset. Gboard offered an opt-out; SwiftKey did not. The study notes that timestamped app usage alone can support inferences about the person typing.

It is just as important to say what the study did not find. Neither keyboard was seen sending the text itself, or even per-character counts. AnySoftKeyboard sent no telemetry at all, which the author reads as proof that this collection is a choice, not a requirement.

Cloud prediction

Some keyboards do send what you type, by design: they ask a server to predict the next word. Then the question becomes how well that traffic is protected.

In 2023 Citizen Lab found that Sogou Input Method, with over 450 million monthly users, sent keystrokes under a home-made encryption scheme that a network eavesdropper could break, on Windows and Android.[3] In 2024 it tested the cloud-prediction pinyin keyboards of nine vendors, including the ones phone makers ship: Samsung, Xiaomi, OPPO, vivo, Honor and Huawei, plus Baidu, iFlytek and Tencent. Eight of the nine had flaws that could expose keystrokes in transit; only Huawei’s held up. Combined with Sogou, the researchers put the exposure at up to one billion users.[2] Most vendors fixed the issues after disclosure, and the reports concern eavesdroppers on the network, not what the vendors themselves do with the text.

Updates and servers

A keyboard that talks to a server needs that channel to be safe in both directions. In 2015 NowSecure disclosed CVE-2015-2865: the SwiftKey-based keyboard Samsung preinstalled fetched language-pack updates over plain HTTP without checking them, ran with system privileges, could not be disabled, and kept checking for updates even when another keyboard was in use. NowSecure’s conservative estimate was 600 million affected devices. SwiftKey’s own store apps were not affected; the flaw was in how the keyboard was built into the phone.[4]

And data collected by a keyboard company lives on that company’s servers. In 2017 Kromtech found an unsecured database belonging to ai.type, a popular third-party keyboard rather than a manufacturer’s, holding records on about 31 million Android users, including data drawn from contact lists. The company disputed how sensitive it was.[5] The general point stands without the dispute: data that is never collected cannot be left exposed.

What we do instead

FluxBoard removes the places this data could go rather than promising to treat it well.[6]

  • No analytics, crash reporter, advertising library, account or Google Play Services. CI fails the build if a Play Services, ML Kit, Firebase or datatransport class appears in a release APK, with a positive control so a broken scan fails loudly.
  • Prediction is on the device. Nothing about typing touches the network; the only network use is moving your library to another phone of yours over your own Wi-Fi.
  • Password and PIN fields are detected from the field’s own input type, not the app’s flag. There the keyboard stops learning, suggesting, autocorrecting, decoding glides and capturing the clipboard. A manual privacy switch covers the fields Android gives no signal about.
  • The personal dictionary and clipboard history are excluded from Android’s cloud backup, and on Android 12 and later, cloud backup is refused outright on a phone with no lock screen.

What we haven’t proven

The checks above read the source, the dependency tree and the built APK. Nobody has yet captured FluxBoard’s live network traffic on a physical phone, the way the studies above did for other keyboards, and reading code is not a substitute for watching it run.[6] The privacy policy says so too. If you do that capture, we would like to see it.

FluxBoard is also a beta keyboard with English only. Everything above is about where your data goes, not a claim that it types better.

Sources

  1. K. Przepiorowski, supervised by D. Leith, "How Private Are Android Keyboards?", MCS dissertation, Trinity College Dublin, 18 April 2022.
  2. Citizen Lab, "The Not-So-Silent Type: Vulnerabilities Across Keyboard Apps Reveal Keystrokes to Network Eavesdroppers", 23 April 2024.
  3. Citizen Lab, "Please do not make it public: Vulnerabilities in Sogou Keyboard encryption expose keypresses to network eavesdropping", 9 August 2023.
  4. SecurityWeek, on NowSecure’s disclosure of CVE-2015-2865 in the SwiftKey-based keyboard preinstalled on Samsung phones, June 2015.
  5. The Hacker News, on Kromtech Security Center’s finding of an exposed ai.type database, December 2017.
  6. FluxBoard, docs/PRIVACY.md, for every claim about FluxBoard here.

05 · what isn’t there yet

Beta, and honest about it

It’s in daily use and it holds up, but it’s a beta. Here’s what isn’t there yet, so you know before you install. Same list as the README.

  • No automatic background removal

    Stickers are cut out with crop and a manual eraser. The automatic version needed ML Kit, which drags in Play Services and a telemetry transport, so it was taken out. It’ll come back only with an open, on-device model that ships in the repo.

  • Link sharing isn’t wired up yet

    The code for sharing a single sticker by link is written, but no screen creates a link yet, and the relay that would carry it off your network isn’t deployed anywhere.

  • Voice input is a placeholder

    And it says so when you tap it.

  • English only

    On one QWERTY-family layout, which is fully remappable.

  • WhatsApp and Discord sticker delivery is unconfirmed

    The underlying bug is fixed and verified at the provider level, but the test phone runs LineageOS without either app. If you have them, a report would help a lot.

06 · build it yourself

Three commands

You need JDK 17+ and the Android SDK for API 36.

git clone https://github.com/uncoalesced/fluxboard.git
cd fluxboard
./gradlew assembleDebug

./gradlew build runs ktlint, the full unit suite, lint, and the release build with its Gradle-side checks. CI adds a scan of the release APK for Play Services, ML Kit, Firebase and datatransport classes, and a 100 MB size limit.

Release signing reads a keystore.properties at the repo root that points at a keystore kept outside it. Neither is committed. Without the file, the release build comes out unsigned instead of failing, so fresh clones and CI just work.

07 · under the hood

Four app modules, no server

FluxBoard implementation choices by layer
UIJetpack Compose, including inside the keyboard itself
ArchitectureMVVM with unidirectional data flow
DIHilt (the IME’s own ViewModels are built by hand)
PersistenceRoom for anything queryable, files on disk for sticker bytes
ConcurrencyCoroutines and Flow
SizeAbout 8 MB installed, with a 100 MB ceiling enforced in CI

app is settings and sticker management. keyboard-core is the IME, prediction, theming and clipboard. sticker-core is the data layer and image pipeline. transfer is device-to-device migration. keyboard-core depends on sticker-core because the keyboard renders your sticker library.

Min SDK 26 (Android 8.0), target SDK 36. The app is pure Kotlin; Python is used only for the offline dictionary, emoji and icon tooling.

08 · standing on shoulders

Prior art

  • FlorisBoard, the main reference for building an Android IME, and for its theming and dictionary approach.
  • EweSticker, prior art for a sticker keyboard and multi-format sticker handling.
  • LocalSend, the model for serverless transfer between devices on a network.
  • ZXing and qrcode-kotlin for QR pairing. Both are Apache-2.0 and neither needs Play Services.
  • SCOWL, whose word lists filter the dictionary corpus. Without them the raw corpus ships misspellings as common words, and autocorrect refuses to fix the typos you make most.

Contributions are welcome. The big non-negotiable: nothing may add telemetry or a Play Services dependency. Right now, bug reports from real use are worth more than patches.

MIT licensed. Copyright 2026 uncoalesced and ZapCannonYT.